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Vibrant professional communities not only reflect on how they interact with the society they serve, but also seek to improve their ability to render the unique services that grant them their raison d'être. Military journals capture emerging trends in technology, doctrine, and organization with the intent of informing, educating and improving the professional attributes of their readership. Journals also provide the forum for constantly testing and revalidating or modifying bedrock assumptions. Recently, a number of articles in the Naval Institute's Proceedings have questioned the continued validity of the nine recognized principles of war without modification or wholesale change. 1 Providing more fuel for the debate, the Joint Staff has prepared a white paper, An Evolving Joint st Century, that among other things seeks to synthesize the existing principles of war, the principles of war for
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Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and the fundamentals of joint
operations into an inclusive framework of fundamentals suited for crisis resolution in the 21 st century. 2 The principles of war are actually quite modern, only existing in their current form since 1949, and have historically generated debates in regard to what terms should be used and in what manner each term should be defined. 3 Just as the terms and definitions have changed in the past, the principles may change in the future, assuming there is a well founded reason and that the new term and/or definition is better than the one it replaces.
One premise for questioning the contemporary and future usage of the existing principles is the basis of their inspiration, the Napoleonic Age. Some question the utility The current principles of war will serve well to the strategic horizons reflected in Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020). In their current form, the principles of war still take into account the nature of war as it exists and as the profession expects war to exist in the future. Only a few of the existing principles of war are being seriously debated; yet, in most cases, existing joint doctrine and definitions already take into consideration the supposed shortcomings of these principles in question. The Joint Staff's white paper seeks to modify, replace, or add to the recognized principles of war in other ways not being debated in military journals. The Joint Staff's proposal would result in a list of fundamentals no longer applicable at all levels of war and in no way better than the existing principles of war. Therefore, the current principles will, and should, continue to guide commanders from platoon-level to the White House.
There is another compelling reason for retaining the current principles of war in their current form. The existing principles of war will continue to serve perhaps an important function as a tool for the rigorous analytical study of the past. As the profession moves forward and transforms, all componencies-land, air/space, searequire a common and simple language to communicate to one another; today's principles fulfill that need. The nature of war has not changed, nor will it change in the immediate future; it remains and will remain a human endeavor. The study of past military events has benefited from the application of the principles of war; current military operations and the study of recent operations will also benefit from the application of these same principles. The principles of war remain remarkably capable of dealing with sweeping societal and technological changes-the stuff of revolutions in military affairs-and will still render valuable service in the 21 st century.
Today's principles of war-mass, economy of force, maneuver, offensive, objective, surprise, security, simplicity, and unity of command-are ubiquitous in the discourse of military professionals. They continue to serve a critical role in the indoctrination and training of future practitioners of the military art by providing a means of approaching past and present military matters. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia defines the principles of war as the "best effort of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant" with applicability at all levels of war. 4 In its premier statement of doctrine, FM 3.0, the Army views the principles as a "guide" to commanders in combining all elements of combat power "to produce overwhelming effects." 5 Like the Joint Encyclopedia definition, the Army believes the existing principles are capable of spanning the spectrum of conflict-high intensity to "operations other than war"-and the levels of war-tactical, operational and strategic -but cautions that in and of themselves, the principles of war should never be considered prescriptive for every situation. They are "the enduring bedrock" of Army doctrine but are not "a checklist." 6 The Marine Corps acknowledges its "warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare is rooted in the principles of war," and like Army doctrine, it counsels against attempts at rote application since "successful application of the principles requires a commander's judgment, skill, and experience to adapt to constantly changing conditions and situations." 7 offensive action seeks to "seize, retain, and exploit the initiative." 10 Yet seemingly concerned that offensive action alone may be viewed as an ends and means unto itself, the Joint Staff's white paper proposes the fundamental of initiative. The new definition, "seize, retain, and exploit opportunities to impose friendly will by establishing the terms and conditions of the action, and by forcing the adversary (if present) to react to them," is more complex than the existing definition, using almost four times as many words to convey the same meaning. 11 Substituting the current principle of offensive for initiative, a word that currently defines offensive, is unnecessary and the resulting definition is wordy. One would expect joint commanders to understand how defending does not mean surrendering the initiative if the defense shapes the enemy and sets the conditions for future offensive operations. There is no compelling reason to substitute the term initiative for offensive.
The proposal to substitute end state for objective also appears to be a question of semantics rather than necessity. The current purpose of objective "is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective." 12 End state, as proposed, is defined as directing "every military operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective that achieves intended strategic or operational outcomes." 13 The Joint Staff proposal builds on the existing definition but limits its utility by defining it at the operational and strategic levels of war, something commanders should be able to infer for themselves. Substituting end state for objective is unnecessary.
Simplicity, the preparation of "uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding," remains especially relevant if one continues to accept war as an extremely complex human endeavor. Given NSM2004's recognition that rapid deployment and access will continue to depend on "regional alliances and coalitions," an already complicated activity takes on an additional layer of complexity when one considers the cultural, linguistic and technological barriers that must be surmounted before the enemy is even considered. 14 For the 21 st century, the Joint Staff proposes understanding in lieu of simplicity. The new term is defined with the old definition but constrained to be only applicable at the operational and strategic levels of war.
Understanding is defined as "know, comprehend, and share common relevant knowledge of the global battlespace to facilitate operational execution." 15 The definition is built on the promises of the Information Age that have not been fully realized and will be last achieved at the tactical level of war. In this instance the change is not one of semantics and there is the possibility of losing sight of the purpose and meaning of simplicity as it metamorphoses into understanding. Sharing is important, but military operations require direction in the form of orders. Those who may perhaps benefit the most from the admonishment of the principle of simplicity, those new to the profession of arms, would be denied its warning should it become the fundamental of understanding. Sharing information could easily be confused with passing information. Simplicity's aim is to make sure that whatever is shared or passed in the form of orders is understood.
The events of 11 September 2001 spoke directly to the continued relevance of surprise and its reciprocal, security. Future adversaries will continue to gain access to the same technologies available to the United States, thus the relevance of these principles remains. Speed, an important concept in the transformation debate, is really a function of surprise. 16 Proposed modifications for the principles of security and surprise are the best examples of attempts to replace useful terms and definitions with poor substitutes.
Security, never permitting "the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage," would be replaced with safeguarding the force. Whereas the current definition is succinct, the new definition leaves latitude for the imagination as it compels the commander to "protect friendly forces from adversarial surprise or from the potential effects of other detrimental Some visions of the future may question the relevance of maneuver. Taken to the extreme, proponents of Network-Centric promise the ability of dispersed platforms to mass their effects, not only from a distance, but without maneuver. 19 This possibility seems quite distant; even Hollywood's all-seeing Matrix retains room for maneuver and JV2004 anticipates uncooperative foes willing to resist the United States' effort to impose its will, creating the need for "dominant maneuver." 20 Moreover, the Joint Staff's white paper sees a need for joint maneuver, a concept that again shifts away from application at all levels of war.
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More hotly debated are the principles of mass, economy of force and unity of command. Mass is the leading candidate for those who seek to modify the principles of war. One proposal suggests replacing mass with the principle of persistent precision. 22 Today's definition of mass-the concentration of combat power-already takes into account the technological changes that have taken place since Waterloo. Mass incorporates the notion of "effects" in both time and space and is not limited to fires or the numbers of soldiers and tanks present on the battlefield. 23 If precision increases the ability to mass effects at the right place and time from beyond the reach of the enemy, so much the better. But it is by the cumulative effect that one seeks to break the will of the enemy; precision may be a force multiplier, but it remains subordinate to the principle of mass.
The current definition of mass has a deficiency. Just as firepower is ephemeral in that it "cannot hold ground," so are its effects. 24 In this respect the current definition of mass may need an adjustment that incorporates the notion of "persistency" if the United Economy of force, the acceptance of risk required to "achieve overwhelming effects" in the decisive place-strategic to tactical in scope-is directly linked to the principle of mass. Remaining true to Clausewitz's dictum "that all available force must be used simultaneously" the contemporary definition of economy of force still demands that "all elements should have tasks to perform." 26 To change the principle of mass would require rethinking economy of force, which may be the most important idea in NMS2004's "1-4-2-1" force design and size. 27 JV2020 reinforces the notion of having only just enough of the right things at the right place and time using focused logistics to achieve operational objectives. 28 The Joint Staff's proposal to combine mass and economy of force into a single term-application of combat power-risks diluting the inherent strength found in the reciprocal relationship present in mass and economy of force. 29 Calls to substitute unity of command with unity of effort ignore the role of the principles as guides for commanders from the tactical to the strategic level of war. 30 Clausewitz defined war as the continuance of policy with other means, but not divorced from the other elements of national power-economic, informational and diplomatic-cited as a reason for changing from unity of command to unity of effort. 31 Undeniably, an increased role of non-military elements of national power will be required to win the WOT and this is reflected in JV2020 and NMS2004. 32 Recent general officer interest in developing new processes and organizations to better bring non-military elements of national power to bear on current problems speak to this growing consensus. 33 However, the concept of unity of command already captures the essence of what is sought with unity of effort-the ability to plan, direct, coordinate, and above all make decisions.
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Ultimately, one person, the commander regardless of level of war, has to orchestrate the effort to achieve the desired objective, regardless of the means employed. The principle of unity of command does not need to be changed, but organizational adaptations made to ensure unity of effort must continue.
Beyond changing the existing principles, there are calls to add tempo, simultaneity, and will. The Joint Staff's white paper calls for the additional fundamental of tempo, a derivative of converting maneuver to joint maneuver. 35 Tempo is defined as the ability to "establish and control the timing, cycle, sequence, reach, and intensity of an operation to best exploit friendly capabilities against adversaries and situations." 36 What this definition really does is further define how a commander might employ maneuver or the offensive. Defining tempo and adding it to the list of fundamentals is another instance where the Joint Staff's proposal doubts the judgment and experience of the commander. Tempo provides more direction lest the commander forget to apply artistic talent when using the principles of war to think about, plan or execute war at any level.
Simultaneity, as described in the article calling for its addition, amounts to little more than mass as it is currently defined or an expression of economy of force with every asset being employed. 37 The principles of surprise and mass already facilitate discourse on the concept of lockout, the objective of Network-Centric Attack, thus making simultaneity redundant. 38 Adding the concept of will to the current list of principles of war seems superfluous. The profession of arms' very identity is inextricably linked to imposing the nation's will on those who oppose the United States. Winning the struggle of competing wills, Clausewitz's wrestlers attempting to throw one another without being thrown themselves, is the purpose of the profession of arms. The principles of war lend help in getting to that objective, but is it necessary to restate the objective? The Joint Staff's white paper derives its call for the inclusion of will in its list of fundamentals from the MOOTW principle of perseverance. 39 By definition, the white paper's proposal views will as it should be seen, in the realm of strategy, thus adding a fundamental no longer universally applicable at all levels of war.
More disturbing is the line of reasoning followed in one particular Proceedings article. John Morgan and Anthony McIvor offer that "will is often the deciding factor in combat and war." 40 Their evidence is a series of historical examples including the Spartans at Thermopylae, the American Revolution, and Guadalcanal. They also cite the perceived overall effectiveness of the recent "shock and awe" campaign carried out against the Iraqis in 2003. 41 The examples are too simplistic. It is true that the colonists'
will was superior to the will of Great Britain, but the crown had to weigh the value of fighting in America in the context of a global war with greater economic interests elsewhere. Did the Japanese lose at Guadalcanal because the United States broke their will, or did effective interdiction coupled with fierce fighting destroy the Japanese capacity to continue fighting? Imposing one's will does not necessarily mean breaking the will of the opponent. The will to resist may endure beyond the means to resist. Did "shock and awe" break the will of the Iraqi people, or did it compel them to fight on using different means? Breaking the will of the adversary is a laudable goal, but imposing one's will is the objective of war. Leonidas may have had a superior will at Thermopylae, but the mass of Xerxes' army ruled the day.
The current principles of war need no additions, nor do they require major modification to satisfy the needs of today's profession or the future as portrayed by As JV2020 looks to the future it also cites the need for "a Total Force composed of well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands of future joint missions." 42 It further views training and education of the joint force as the "linchpin of progress from vision to experimentation to reality" since "intellectual change" is the basis of the doctrinal, organizational and leadership changes required for "a joint team capable of success across the full range of military operations." 43 The principles of war will continue to play an important role in the education of all officers and serve the armed forces well as they transform. Even so, some will still question the relevance of ideas borne out of the Napoleonic Age and carried forward through the Industrial Age and into the Information Age.
Ironically, those who deride the current principles of war as being Napoleonic miss the point that technology's aim is to restore the Napoleonic battlefield-one on which the commander can survey all of his and the enemy's forces less the "fog." 44 Common Operating Pictures may one day make the commander's view of his battlespace more akin or better than Napoleon's view at Austerlitz, even allowing commanders to penetrate friction-causing atmospheric conditions such as fog. However, until NetworkCentric warfare has matured and provides perfect situational awareness from an all seeing sensor grid, there will still be a need for geniuses with the coup d' oeil described by Clausewitz. 45 Recent scholarship by historian Jon Sumida suggests that what Clausewitz hoped to achieve with On War was a method of learning to facilitate educating the mind of the commander. Among the critical elements of this educational process was the use of "simple and straightforward" language. 46 In a world of evolving TLAs (three letter acronyms), the Army's belief that the principles of war hold their "greatest value" for the "education of the military professional" remains true to the notion of simple language.
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The principles still have an important role to play not only in helping to educate the profession about where it has been, but also by providing a common language for thinking about the future.
As a derivative of Napoleonic warfare, today's principles of war are a relatively modern invention in relation to human history and war, yet they have proved remarkably applicable for the study of war predating their development. They have also met the demands of changing technology since they first appeared in the early nineteenth century.
The Korean War proved even nuclear weapons did not eclipse the utility of the principles of war. It is not that the principles should never be changed, but care must be used to avoid falling victim to an exciting "buzzword" in place of an enduring principle.
Capability-Based Planning (CBP), a concept for organizational transformation within an environment of uncertainty and economic restraints, seeks to meet myriad threats by having on hand the right building blocks-airplanes, units with specific capabilities and equipment, ships. CBP assumes the assembly of various "blocks"-task organization that will inevitably reach across service boundaries-for mission accomplishment.
Putting the blocks together is "old hat," but having the organization, doctrine, command and control, and training for rapid and flexible assembly is not. 48 New terms and radically new definitions do not lend themselves to the already complicated task of fielding new concepts like CBP; putting the purple blocks together will be much easier for all involved if the profession continues to refine and build on existing joint doctrine so heavily influenced by the principles of war.
The WOT is just that, a war. Terrorism, the use of violence or the threat of violence directed at non-combatants with the goal of breaking the civilian population's will, has taken many guises throughout history. Al Queda may be a non-state actor, but its use of terror techniques to impose its will on those it attacks is Clausewitzian, however asymmetrical in the form it takes. 49 The WOT, albeit not always a contest between states, is no less deserving of the application of the same helpful language, concepts and ideas encapsulated in the principles of war. Those who characterize the WOT as a new type of war and see this supposedly new war as a basis for questioning the principles of war are guilty of not critically examining the history of warfare.
One claim is that "battle space has expanded dramatically" and that the enemy is willing to seek "cover and concealment" among the civilian population. 50 The Second There is no compelling reason to change, modify or abandon the current principles of war. They have never provided a formula for success in the classroom, or in the field, but they will continue to provide the profession a means to think about what has happened in the past and how to organize its thoughts for war in the present. Rather than abandon existing terms and definitions or creating new ones, especially during the 
